

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

U.S. POLICY AND NATO TRANSFORMATION

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ABSTRACT

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The United States National Security and Military Strategies both emphasize the importance of alliances and coalitions to the success of our overall security strategy. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is well into a major transformation process and the U.S.A. plays a major leadership role in the success or failure of this transformation. The future of NATO has been under scrutiny since the collapse of Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. In response to this scrutiny and the changing global security posture, NATO acknowledged the need to undergo major changes in order to remain relevant as an alliance. As the world continues to live under the shadow of terrorism, the United States must evaluate its efforts in support of NATO transformation in both the political and military domains. The path set for NATO at the Prague Summit and verified at Istanbul last year, provided little guidance into the methods of achieving these new and exciting objectives. The summit left the military transformation task to the newly formed Allied Command Transformation, a concept also birthed at the summit. The members at Prague provided the following objectives to the Alliance to focus its effort; the alliance should be able to protect human rights, combat terrorism, ensure peace and stability, and prepare forces for conducting expeditionary operations outside of NATO territory. These objectives, coupled with the policy of enlargement, have set the strategic way ahead for transforming NATO. The ever increasing role of the European Union in global security matters, the War on Terror, and the United States' own massive Department of Defense transformation are creating both new challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy makers and the military leaders charged with sustaining NATO transformation. This paper examines the U.S. driven NATO enlargement strategy, discusses the current the enlargement as it relates Istanbul Initiatives, and recommends a transformation action that would enhance NATO's strategic ability to influence out-of-sector operations in support of the enlargement process.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| ABSTRACT..... | III |
| U.S. POLICY AND NATO TRANSFORMATION | 1 |
| OVERVIEW | 1 |
| NATO ENLARGEMENT..... | 3 |
| U.S. SUPPORT | 5 |
| NOT A U.S. LED NATO | 6 |
| FOCUSING ON THE MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE AND THE ISTANBUL COOPERATION INITIATIVE..... | 7 |
| TRANSFORMING THE NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE..... | 9 |
| CONCLUSION | 12 |
| ENDNOTES | 15 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 17 |

U.S. POLICY AND NATO TRANSFORMATION

OVERVIEW

The ongoing debate over the relevance of NATO is not hindering the aggressive transformation being conducted by the alliance. But while the U.S. National security strategy places a high value on the importance of alliances, sometimes our actions and rhetoric do not convey the same message to our allies. Zbigniew Brzezinski summarizes the debate this way: "That is why one argument made in the course of the third grand debate about America's security—that it should denigrate the Atlantic Alliance in favor of a new 'coalition of the willing'—is so misguided. Though not stated openly, it involves an attempt by a highly motivated group within the Bush administration and within the more conservative political circles to execute a strategic 'coup de main' to alter America's fundamental geopolitical priorities. In effect, this group seeks to provide the rationale, the motivation, and the strategy for a new American-led global coalition, replacing the one that America shaped after 1945 during the Cold War."¹

It is in the context of this quote that one can start to look between the lines of the U.S. security strategy and determine if NATO is being given the proper stature in the terms of U.S. support and guidance for NATO transformation. The United States National Security and Military Strategies both emphasize the importance of alliances and coalitions to the success of our overall security strategy. But emphasizing importance on paper and putting resources against the strategy are two different things. Action here is indeed much stronger than words. With the U.S. foreign policy and military efforts focusing on fighting the War on Terror (WOT), efforts of the European Union (EU) and aligned political organizations to assume a larger role in the regional security strategy issues seem to be unrestrained. The entire world witnessed the difficulty of building "coalitions of the willing", when key members of the EU were unwilling to support actions in Iraq. NATO is more relevant than ever by providing a necessary political-military linkage between the EU and the U.S., however, in this case the weight of the EU overrode NATO.

Many argue that the main reason NATO will eventually falter as an alliance is that its only true reason for existence was the Soviet Union as its common enemy. General acceptance of a common threat may be essential and NATO might have to acknowledge a new *raison d'être*. It is from this end that the true design and objectives of the alliance can be capabilities derived. Strategic disarray is sure to be the result if the alliance's collective vision does not drive transformation objectives that meet current and emerging global threats. Identification of this threat must go beyond the general and much over-used global threat of terrorism. The alliance must be ready to articulate specific capability requirements developing organizations, that can

conduct security cooperation activities in the border regions of Europe and wherever the Alliance determines a NATO presence is necessary. This common focus is critical to achieving a unity of purpose that threads all aspects of the alliance together.

There appears to be no other forum that will serve as the place that will allow for the diverging security strategies of the EU and the U.S. to be reconciled. As the U.S. continues to press for the enlargement of NATO, the EU has continued its own enlargement. It is my position that the enlargement of NATO and the EU with "European" countries is inevitable, particularly now that NATO and the EU have come to terms with Russia over this expansion. The U.S. should influence NATO transformation to ensure the organization has a recognized ability to conduct regional security cooperation operations. This capability is particularly important for NATO activity in the Broader Middle East and North Africa. Expanding opportunities being created by NATO's initiatives in the Mediterranean Region and Northern Africa are critical to support of U.S. strategic policy in the region. This focus includes defining the role Turkey will play in the Alliance's efforts to address the future role of NATO in region. The impact of the EU's handling of Turkey's membership desires is also of great concern to the over-arching security strategy for the region. Turkey has a great history of being at the cross-roads of major change in the world. It is incumbent upon the US, the EU, and NATO to recognize Turkey's current place of importance at this new cross-road of world security.

The academic and political arguments over the future of NATO are relevant, but do not prevent NATO from defining its desired role in the future of transatlantic-security matters. It is here where the U.S. and NATO leadership need to take measures to clearly define their strategic vision in order to properly guide the transformation of the organization. This vision can not only address the military aspects of transformation, but also must consider the political objectives of NATO as well. It is the type of transatlantic security organization that must evolve from the transformation process that is most important to the survival of NATO. The ever increasing role of the EU in global security matters, the War on Terror, and the United States' own massive Department of Defense transformation are creating both new challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy makers and the military leadership charged with sustaining NATO transformation. This paper examines the U.S. driven NATO enlargement strategy, and presents two positions concerning NATO transformation that would enhance NATO's strategic vision of conducting out-of-sector operations.

NATO ENLARGEMENT

We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers.
And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every
continent

- President George W. Bush,
West Point, New York, 01 June, 2002

The United States National Security and Military Strategies both emphasize the importance of alliances and coalitions to the success of our overall strategy. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is one of the most important U.S. alliances and the success or failure of NATO will significantly influence U.S. National Security Policy. The future of NATO has been under scrutiny since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. In response to this scrutiny and the changing global security posture, the United States is leading NATO through a significant transformation process. This process includes a policy of expanding the size of the alliance by adding new members, commonly referred to as enlargement. Given the fact the organization is undergoing a significant transformation as well as redefining its role in the post-Cold War era, is now the right time for continued expansion? If expansion continues, should the Global War on Terrorism cause the NATO alliance increase its focus not only to the East, but also to the south?

In order to achieve the country's National Security goals, the United States National Security Strategy (NSS) places emphasis on the continued need for strong alliances throughout the world. The NSS further states that the 'alliance must be able to act wherever our interests are threatened, creating coalitions under NATO's own mandate, as well as contributing to mission-based coalitions.'² This statement could be interpreted as a message from the United States that the use of NATO forces should not be constrained by UN or EU mandates. It can also be seen as the policy direction that the U.S. is taking concerning coalition building in order to take preemptive action. This policy could include NATO forces being employed as a military option in order to support the interests of U.S. National Security. Although supported by NATO, the influence of the EU's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) could lead to a degree of uncertainty among NATO members. The political and economic influence the EU members can place on EU NATO countries will likely compete with U.S. influence on NATO policy development. There is also the concern that the EU's fielding of its own Rapid Reaction Forces will directly compete with NATO and its resources. The influence of the EU on NATO is of immense importance concerning the policy of enlargement. If NATO policy moves too far out of line with EU policy, pressure from the EU could seriously affect the ability of NATO to act as an

alliance. With military forces from NATO member states currently conducting operations in Iraq without EU consent, we may be witnessing a defining moment for NATO. NATO members currently in Iraq do not have concurrence of the EU or the Alliance as a whole, nor did NATO invoke Article 5 to support the U.S. in OIF. This type of action supports the concept of “coalitions of the willing” as being the method for conducting multinational operations in the absence of an Alliance.

The dynamics of the EU involvement in NATO are worth mentioning because the EU does have a great deal of influence over the future of NATO. NATO and EU officials meet on a regular basis at different levels; at foreign ministers’ level twice a year, at ambassadors’ level (the North Atlantic Council with the EU’s Political and Security Committee) a minimum of three times per semester, at the committee level on a regular basis, and at staff level on a routine basis.³ This influence will certainly be considered by United States policy makers as they envision NATO’s role in U.S. security policy. The NSS provides six surprisingly well-defined core goals for the Alliance.⁴ One of the goals is to expand NATO membership to democratic nations willing and able to share the burden of defending and advancing our common interests. This language directly links the concept of NATO enlargement to U.S. National security policy. It is the promotion of democratic values that has also become a driving factor in the defining a new NATO. French President Jacques Chirac emphasized the role of democracy in these words: “It is not mere coincidence that NATO’s preamble refers to a concept of the organization of states and international life founded on democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law, and faith in the principles of the United Nations Charter. Our peoples have entrusted us with the task of defending and vitalizing these principles, which provide the very essence of the community of free nations formed by our Alliance.”⁵ A truly transformed NATO must remain capable of promoting both security and democratic values. Within that context, new membership may be based on bilateral security agreements between the alliance and prospective countries that are emerging democracies. A transformed NATO must have the will and the ability to assist emerging democracies provide the secure environment necessary for democracy to grow.

The escalation of terrorism throughout world has only confirmed the need for NATO and its role in the world as a security organization. NATO recent involvement in Afghanistan is a good example of the global capabilities within the Alliance. The introduction of NATO into the Central Asia region is an excellent building block for future operations in area that is arguably one of the more likely hot spots for future conflicts. The global terror threat has effectively replaced the threat vacuum created when the Soviet Union dissolved. When combining the terror threat with the argument that NATO should also have the role of promoting democracy,

one can easily see a link between transformation and the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Taking this one step further and using Jacques Chirac's comment as context, one must agree with the NATO political leaders who believe the shared democratic values of the alliance are more relevant to the alliance than having a shared enemy. Luke Hill (Jane's Defense Weekly) argues that the GWOT sets conditions that favor NATO enlargement. He contends that NATO's swift action to invoke Article 5 (the mutual self-defense clause after the September 11, 2001 attacks) has served to bolster support in Congress and abroad for continued NATO expansion.⁶ It is the NATO response to 9/11 that helps define the need for transforming NATO capabilities and the actual purpose of the organization in order to respond to the new security situation. NATO is developing policy that includes the employment of a NATO rapid response force to conduct 'expeditionary' security operations in a crisis, provide forces to conduct peace keeping operations, and to conduct consequence management operations. This transformation directly competes with the resources needed for NATO to effectively continue a policy of enlargement. The U.S. led drive for enlargement at a time of such monumental change is significant and should be cause for concern. As previously stated, the political complexities of U.S., EU, and NATO relationships are only a part of the overall difficulty in determining the right course to take in regards to enlargement. There are other noteworthy challenges pertaining to expansion, including the difficulty of NATO to act as a solid alliance when a difference in ideology is involved in a conflict. Additionally, Allied Command Transformation is dealing with the large growth in the technology gap between members and countries' aspiring to become members has evolved.

U.S. SUPPORT

NATO transformation is being conducted simultaneously with a significant U.S. Department of Defense transformation. The U.S. transformation includes a major change to its global posture and calls for the withdrawal of the majority of ground troops from Europe. Many in Europe have always believed that the success of NATO was directly linked to the assurance of U.S. involvement in a conflict if its forces were attacked as result of being stationed on the European Continent. Keeping this concept in mind, is there a mixed message being sent by U.S. policymakers when it comes to the future of NATO? As stated above, U.S. policy is very directive concerning the requirements of NATO. On the other hand, U.S. policy also reduces its commitment in Europe. The stationing of over 100,000 troops in Europe carries a large amount of political influence with it, but it is also important to look at the financial costs associated with our forward posture in Europe. The U.S. has announced an approximate reduction of 60,000

troops in Europe. When including families in this total, the Army will reduce its presence by over 100,000 American personnel in theater. Again, does this reduction raise a serious question concerning the level U.S. commitment? Without the large troop presence and commensurate political capital, can the U.S. remain the leading force of NATO? U.S. Foreign and Military policy makers must engage the EU and Congress on this issue. It can be assumed that the U.S. expects to continue to lead the alliance, and maintain a credible presence in Theater. To achieve this goal, the U.S. is refining its forward basing concept. While reducing its presence in Germany, the U.S. is increasing its presence in Italy and creating forward operating sites in Poland, Bulgaria and Romania.

NOT A U.S. LED NATO

By continuing a policy of NATO enlargement while decreasing our presence, one could make the argument that the U.S. is endorsing a policy that could lead to an alliance that is less likely to act in support U.S. national interests. Should this occur, the U.S. could cede control of NATO to the EU. The EU could then assimilate NATO into its organization to serve as its military instrument of power and NATO would cease to exist as a true trans-Atlantic alliance. The parallel fielding of the EU Corps with the NATO Rapid Reaction Forces underscores the commitment of the EU to becoming a powerful global influence. The changing global security environment will continue to cause U.S. and NATO to review how the alliance transforms and this review must result in a better definition of its objectives. But the review must be much larger than just transformation or enlargement; it must provide a redefined purpose of the alliance that is accepted and resourced. As NATO expands and conducts military operations outside of the Alliance borders a common understanding of Article 5 direction must be shared by all members. When reviewing the summary of Article 5 found in Paul Gallis' Congressional Research Report to Congress, one sees the need for a redefined Article V that will support future NATO deployments operating out-of-sector in support of collective security operations not addressed under the current collective defense guidelines:

ARTICLE V Summary - A collective security organization settles disputes among its members. In contrast, a collective defense organization assists a member state under attack by an outside country. NATO is a collective defense organization. Article V states that NATO members must consider coming to the aid of an ally under attack. However, it does not guarantee assistance. Article V is the Treaty's key provision and the linchpin binding the United States to its NATO allies. It states, in part, that "an armed attack against one or more [allies] shall be considered an attack against them all." Additional language makes clear that the commitment to assist an ally is not unconditional. Rather, each signatory will assist the ally under attack with "such action as it deems necessary, including

the use of armed force"(1) Since the early 1990s, NATO has begun to adopt "new missions," such as crisis management and peacekeeping, sometimes referred to as "non-Article V missions." Current members and candidate states, however, believe collective defense, as expressed in Article V, remains the core of the alliance, a view likely to endure as long as the possibility of a nationalistic, aggressive Russia remains. ⁷

For NATO to lock itself into a Euro-centric enlargement policy, might in the end, accelerate its demise. If one concedes that the greatest threat to Global Security is the possession of Weapons of Mass Effects (WME) by non-state actors or terrorists, the world needs an organization that can serve as the tool to expand its security umbrella. Currently, NATO is the only organization that could rapidly expand successful programs like Partnership for Peace and Security Cooperation into a global engagement program. NATO could export this program well beyond its current focus in order to start the creation of a 'global anti-terrorism security organization.'

The future of NATO enlargement is contentious at best. The influence of globalization in general, a challenging global security environment, continued growth of the EU's power and influence, and the rapid pace of technological advances are just some of the challenges facing the NATO alliance today. The transformation of NATO must continue to emphasize its commitment to collective security for its members, reach out to support those countries struggling to implement democratic reforms, and serve as major contributor to the war on terrorism.

FOCUSING ON THE MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE AND THE ISTANBUL COOPERATION INITIATIVE

In 1995, NATO established a Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) with six countries – Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, and Tunisia – in the wider Mediterranean region. The program which was joined by Algeria in 2000 is aimed at creating good relations and improving mutual understanding with the countries of the Mediterranean area, as well as promoting regional security and stability. ⁸ The Mediterranean Dialogue is an integral part of the Alliance's cooperative security efforts. A key principle of the Dialogue is how it complements the EU's economic and financial efforts in the region. Under what is known as the Barcelona Declaration, the EU has defined a framework for increased European and Mediterranean partnerships. The declaration outlines three major objectives: a political and security partnership, an economic and financial partnership, and a social and cultural partnership. The common tie between NATO and the EU should foster continued cooperation between the two organizations, and thus, progress

can be expected in this vital region of the world. The U.S. National policy makers must ensure NATO efforts in the Mediterranean Dialogue are nurtured and encouraged, but they should also ensure that our National Security interests in the region are not minimized. Recently NATO has indicated that it is taking a far more aggressive approach in the region. In July of last year, the Alliance published a policy document that articulates a "More Ambitious and Expanded Framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue."⁹ The key principles of the Expanded Framework focus on increase cooperation and responsiveness to the MD countries. It also takes steps to ensure unity of purpose between NATO the EU, OSCE, and the G8. It also acknowledges the efforts of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI).

The swift evolution of the ICI and a transformed NATO ready to act on global security issues confirms the determination of the Alliance to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. The ICI directs a comprehensive approach for NATO's efforts in the broader Middle East region and articulates a long-term vision for NATO's role in the security of the region. The aim of the ICI is to enhance security and regional stability through a trans-Mediterranean engagement process that includes the EU and NATO. This aim could be achieved by actively promoting NATO's cooperation with the interested countries in the field of security, particularly through practical activities where NATO can develop the ability of a country's forces to operate with those of the Alliance. This could include contributions of forces to NATO led operations in the fight against terrorism, actions to stem the flow of WMD materials, preventing illegal trafficking in arms, fighting narco-drug traffic, halting human slave sales, and improving the country's capabilities to address common challenges and threats with NATO.¹⁰ It is in this initiative that one can see the potential for NATO taking a lead role concerning the Israeli-Palestine conflict. General Harald Kujat, NATO's Military Committee Chairman recently made this remark, "A deepening of NATO's relationship in the region will undoubtedly have many benefits for Israel, sitting at the heart of it. Not only will NATO's members benefit from the security perspective, the Alliance will for its own sake. You see, as Israel is a key ally of the United States in the region, a rapprochement of NATO with Israel can only benefit the transatlantic link that has suffered scratches and bruises in the past couple of years. Solid relations between Israel and the European Allies will only add on top of what makes Israel today a strategic asset of the United States in the region."¹¹ Additionally, without international and regional support for the U.S. in Middle East and North Africa, the most basic tasks of the counter-terrorism effort will be difficult to meet. These regions lack a unifying regional security and defense cooperation organization such as NATO, to multilaterally legitimize U.S. presence in the region. The nations of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates formed the Gulf Cooperation

Council (GCC) in 1981 to strengthen cooperation and security among its members, but the U.S. does not belong to the organization. Although the governments of the most GCC members have close bilateral and economic ties with the U.S., they do not publicly endorse U.S. policy for the following reasons:¹²

- U.S. Policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has eroded U.S. influence in the Gulf and increased the sense of vulnerability of the Gulf regimes.
- Gulf public opinion is wary of the U.S. led war on terrorism, viewing it mainly as an anti-Islamic campaign.
- Gulf regimes see their ties to the U.S. as a political liability.

Leveraging the ICI through the NATO Alliance will help the U.S. gain greater access to the region and help overcome the challenges outlined above. Using NATO as a mechanism to further enhance security and promote democratic values in North African Region should be a key objective of the Alliance. The U.S. has effectively used its ties with the GCC to maintain its presence in the Persian Gulf region and receive support in the war on terror. The NATO transformation process must result in an Alliance that has the ability fully engage in security cooperation efforts outlined in these initiatives. U.S. effort must include a more proactive dialogue with Turkey, one of our NATO partners. There is sure to be residual friction from failure of the U.S. and Turkey to come to an agreement on launching the now infamous northern option during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The U.S. must look beyond that confrontation and acknowledge the vast potential Turkey has in bringing stability to the region. For Turkey to be considered as one of the key allies in the region is an understatement. They are in fact, poised to serve a pivotal leadership role in the region. The mere fact that the Turkish thinking appears to have developed from a position against the clash of civilizations into one that is advocating a proactive policy to overcome the challenges the Muslim world faces shows the determination of the country to take on a lead role in the area. ¹³ The U.S. leaders in NATO political and military matters must take advantage of the growing opportunities in the region being developed by the alliance.

TRANSFORMING THE NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE

In order to establish a consistent and capable NATO effort in the Mediterranean Region (and Russian/Eur-Asia) NATO must have inherent abilities within its command structure. The NATO operational level commands, JFC-Brunssum and JFC-Naples, must be organized with assigned Areas of Responsibility (AORs) that include countries outside of NATO to effectively

conduct security cooperation activities. Following the U.S. model of having geographically oriented Unified Commands, NATO could similarly task the JFCs to develop and resource command plans that support the Alliance's strategic goals. As NATO expansion continues, the number commands and the size of AORs could expand as well.

The strategic environment and issues discussed above can be used as arguments to drive NATO transformation to this next level. The U.S. strategy certainly emphasizes the need for U.S. forces to have the ability to operate with multinational forces. Joint Vision (JV) 2020 also reemphasizes the very important role our multinational partners will continue to have in the future, but it also provides the context for the role of NATO support to the Commander of the U.S. European Command (CDR, USEUCOM) theater strategy plan. JV 2020 states the following: "The Commander must have the ability to evaluate information in its multinational context. That context can only be appreciated if sufficient regional expertise and liaison capability are available on the commander's staff. A deep understanding of the cultural, political, military, and economic characteristics of a region must be established and maintained. Developing this understanding is dependent upon shared training and education, especially with the key partners, and may require organizational change as well. The overall effectiveness of multinational operations is, therefore, dependent on interoperability between organizations, processes, and technologies." ¹⁴

For NATO to fully exploit the significant opportunities present by the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, the Alliance must have an organization that is focused on this region.

NATO transformation actions since the Prague Summit included a command structure reorganization. While this reorganization took many steps in the right direction and supports the new objectives of NATO, it stopped short of some key concepts. NATO is now comprised of a strategic war fighting headquarters called Allied Command Operations (ACO) and a functional command called Allied Command Transformation (ACT). Allied Command Operations, commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander – Europe (SACEUR), is the only NATO command with operational responsibilities. ACO will primarily function at the strategic level and will have two standing subordinate Joint Force Commands designed to function at the operational level. One of the Joint Force Commands is located in Brunssum, The Netherlands and the other in Naples, Italy. Both will have the ability to conduct operations from their static locations or provide a land-based Combined Joint Task Force headquarters (CJTF) and a robust, but limited standing Joint Headquarters (JHQ). It is at the Joint Force Commands that NATO needs to take the next step in transforming to meet current and future challenges.

Both of these commands have assigned Areas of Responsibility (AOR). These AORs, however, are limited now that NATO has assumed a global posture for security operations. For example, JFC – Brunssum's area of responsibility includes Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and the United Kingdom. It also includes the North Sea, Irish Sea, English Channel, Skagerrak, Kattegat, the Sound of Belts, and the Baltic Sea.¹⁵ This AOR is limited to areas currently in the NATO footprint. It is my recommendation that an effort be made to expand the AORs of each NATO JFC to include geographic areas that fall along the seams of the current AOR and in many cases already have NATO engagement efforts taking place.

As part of this AOR expansion I recommend NATO assign JFC-Naples those areas encompassed by the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Cooperation Initiative, and other European agreements and initiatives in this region. Formalizing NATO efforts in this region could support NATO and the Theater Security Cooperation Plans for both USEUCOM and USCENTCOM. NATO could easily adopt the principles from the following USEUCOM definition of Security Cooperation (SC): Security Cooperation is defined as all DOD interaction with foreign defense establishments to:

- Build relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests
- Build allied and friendly capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations
- Provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access and en route infrastructure.

A particular aim of the DOD's security cooperation efforts is to ensure access, interoperability, and intelligence cooperation, while expanding the range of pre-conflict options available to counter coercive threats, deter aggression, or favorably prosecute war on the U.S. terms.¹⁶

NATO may not adopt the U.S. definition, but could use similar language. For example, NATO security cooperation could be defined in the following context: NATO security cooperation is designed to promote alliance security interests in the region. NATO activities will include both political and military engagement to assist countries in maintaining secure and stable environments that foster the growth of Democracy. Cooperation efforts will include promoting support for future peacetime or contingency operations necessary to maintain regional stability, assist in projecting NATO forces through out the world, and developing capable militaries that provide for security in their own countries or are able to assist in future NATO contingency operations.

The benefits of a coordinated effort between commands would be considerable. Both NATO and USEUCOM have many efforts in Partnership for Peace, military-to-military contacts,

and other activities oriented in those countries located along the seams of the NATO AOR. Concurrent with my recommendation for JFC-Naples to focus on North Africa and Mediterranean; JFC-Brunssum should continue with its efforts in Russia and Eur-Asia. By guiding NATO towards expanded AORs, the CDR, USEUCOM would have assistance in shaping his AOR and gain a great deal of assistance in achieving U.S. national objectives in the USEUCOM Theater. Using this approach the U.S. can look beyond Europe, NATO and USEUCOM as targets for security cooperation and expand NATO's role as a partner to assist in achieving our own national objectives. This is particularly important in the area that includes the broader Middle East and North Africa where our access and ability to interact with regional governments is extremely limited. There is a seam created between USCENTCOM and USEUCOM AORs, but NATO could address issues along the seams just as they are addressed by the U.S. commands today.

The above extract from Joint Vision 2020 articulates the need for regional expertise in order to better execute multinational operations and as critical component to the success of our region security strategies. We must take this step one step farther and recognize the immense benefit that NATO and the U.S. military would receive from units and personnel dedicated to developing as regional experts. The U.S. military has seen the negative consequences of the lack of regional experts as we prosecute the War on Terror. Driving NATO into AOR specific orientations for the two Joint Force Commands would create organizations that possess critical skills necessary for successful execution of U.S., Coalition, or NATO operations in these vital regions. The U.S. would likely benefit from NATO HUMINT and cultural expertise efforts in these regions.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. National Security Strategy directly influences the development of the National Military Strategy and provides the vision for the role of the U.S. military in international security matters. The NATO political and military bodies also provide direction to the alliance and define the long term strategy for the future of the alliance. At the recent Istanbul Summit NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, helped define the way ahead for the transforming the alliance by describing NATO's overarching mission as "projecting stability". He went on further to say that "Territorial defence remains a core function, but we simply can no longer protect our security without addressing the potential risks and threats arise far from our homes. Either we tackle these problems when and where they emerge, or they will end up on our doorstep."¹⁷

It is this focus on projecting stability that brings the discussions of this paper to light. NATO must reexamine its efforts and commitment of resources in order to meet the requirements of this new mission. As the leader of the military wing of the alliance, the United States must provide the necessary political and military support to ensure the alliance's transformation efforts remain aligned with U.S. international security objectives. NATO is critical to the long term efforts in the War on Terrorism and to the ability of the U.S. to influence areas of the world that currently do not readily accept U.S. presence or political objectives. In a recent article, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat argued that the "form of the transatlantic security relationship is changing. The absence of any major security threat from Europe and the fact that most threats to international security are now found outside of Europe, are diverse in nature, and are often ill-defined are leading to the emergence of a different type of transatlantic security relationship. These extra-regional threats require flexible and multi-pronged responses. In sum, I contend that the institutional framework of the transatlantic security relationship is transforming."¹⁸ I completely agree with Ms. de Jonge Oudraat's assessment that actual institutional framework of NATO is transforming and I have used this paper to suggest that the United States must increase leadership role in guiding this transformation. In the case of NATO enlargement, the U.S. must ensure the alliance is a true benefactor from increasing membership at the current pace.

While the organization has changed immensely in recent years, the enlargement policy has remained unchanged and continues to have an open door policy. Enlargement has allowed the U.S. and the NATO members to politically influence aspiring nations to achieve certain levels of political and military reform. Enlargement is certainly viewed as critical pillar in NATO's role in spreading democratic values in the region. However, as recently as February of this year the political viability of the alliance came under attack by one of the NATO's most prominent members. At NATO's annual gathering in Munich, German Defense Minister Peter Struck read a speech for German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder that had a very surprising message. Chancellor Schröder's message was this: "NATO is no longer the primary place where the transatlantic partners can discuss and coordinate their strategic issues." Most politicians interpreted this speech to mean that Schröder wants to diminish the role of the alliance and that he does not perceive NATO as having future in the region.¹⁹

The surprising announcement by Schröder should be taken as a significant warning that the role of NATO in regional or global affairs remains an issue for grand debate. Taking this into consideration the U.S. must use its significant influence in NATO to ensure that a transformed alliance has both military and political viability in the region. The impact of continued

enlargement on the alliance's ability to meet transformation objectives must be addressed. The alliance must adopt policy that drives the transformational process vice allowing transformation to drive policy. Enlargement cannot result in a water downed alliance that is politically handicapped, but results in an alliance that increases its global strength. This is particularly true concerning out-of-sector operations and the types of forces needed to accomplish these operations. While developing expeditionary capabilities the alliance must be able to focus and resource forces in concert with the political objectives of the organization. As the alliance expands its role in the world as a global collective security alliance, it must be able to influence its own region and those world regions that influence the both transatlantic and global security. In the end, NATO must have a military that is capable of promoting the alliance's political policies and agenda throughout the world. In order to do this the alliance must examine the impact enlargement is having on the alliance and ensure the enlargement policy. This examination must include a review of NATO's activities in the crucial boundary regions of the broader Middle East and North Africa. As the alliance expands operations in the border regions it must consider expanding its current joint headquarters to ensure they are capable of implementing policy and supporting NATO's military and political objectives.

WORD COUNT= 6,123

ENDNOTES

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